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Abstract 
 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the main determinants of IPO underpricing 
for firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore from 2004 to 2008. Data collected from the 
Datastream and Reuters, together with the information disclosure in both stock 
exchanges is used to examine the significance of different variables in order to explain 
the IPO underpricing level. We find that operating margin, financial leverage, firm size, 
IPO offer size and overallotment option exercised, to some extent, influence the IPO 
underpricing for both markets. Based on the regressions, we could conclude that the 
difference between the levels of IPO underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore can be 
explained by the financial leverage and firm size. Firm size is the primary determinant 
as compared to financial leverage. 
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1 Introduction 
In this introductory chapter choice and motives behind the research topic are presented and 
this leads up to the purpose of the thesis. The chapter is ended by delimitations and the 
outline of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background  
In early year 2007, Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in Asian market were so popular that 
investors literally were queuing up to subscribe the shares. The region was overfilled with 
liquidity from hedge fund managers, mutual funds, and equity investors. While market 
indexes in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore were rocket high, lots of companies were 
eager to raise capital through IPO pipeline. It wasn't uncommon for shares to reach triple-digit 
gains on their first day of trading. Investors are more than willing to participate in such IPOs 
phenomenon. 
However, the contrast couldn't be starker in the beginning of year 2008. With the shock waves 
of the subprime crisis continuing to spread and bears stalking equity markets worldwide, the 
global liquidity crunch has taken a heavy toll on Asia's IPO market. Steven Barg, head of 
equity capital markets for Asia at UBS says that companies hungry for cash will have to price 
their issues at as much as a 20% discount to the price-earnings ratios of comparable listed 
firms if they want to IPO successfully. Six months ago, these companies could have offered 
no discount and still easily floated their shares. "It's now a buyer's market," he says.  
Financial hubs in Asia like Hong Kong and Singapore are badly affected from the global 
credit crisis. Hong Kong has had just one listing by February, New Media Group Holdings, 
and the IPO raised a mere $13.1 million. Compared to prior year mid-February in 2007, Hong 
Kong companies had already raised $512 million from four issues. The story is similar in 
Singapore: $23.6 million shared among three issues in 2008 as compared with $283 million 
from four issues in the first six weeks of 2007 (Sourced from Business Week.com, 
22/2/2008). 
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1.2 Problem discussion 
IPOs have been a prominent focus of conceptualization and empirical tests since the 1960s 
(Reilly & Hatfield, 1969). Much of this attention can be attributed to the increase in IPO 
activity as a function of the "dot com" phenomenon especially in the late 1990s. Of particular 
interest to both academicians and practitioners is IPO underpricing. There are evidences that 
the IPO prices increase substantially on the first trading day and leave considerable amount of 
‘money left on the table’ (Ibbotson, 1975 and others). Researchers offered several theories to 
argue that underpricing of IPO is an equilibrium phenomenon in an efficient capital market 
which indicates that IPO underpricing is deliberated by the issuers and underwriters for a 
variety of reasons. Much of the attentions have been paid to the information asymmetry 
problem. Rock (1982 and 1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986), followed by others, argue that 
issuers were coerced to underprice their IPOs to attract investors. Investors would ask for high 
returns as there is more uncertainty on the valuation of the IPO due to the information 
heterogeneity. Others argue that issuers strategically underprice their IPO to signal the 
favorable prospects of the firm (see e.g. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989) and Welch (1989)). Determinants of the IPO underpricing level vary from firm specific 
factors (i.e. profitability, size and industry), market condition, to investors behaviors (Welch 
(1992) and Loughran and Ritter (2002)). 
 
However, empirical evidences show that the relationship between IPO underpricing and its 
determinants are not consistent across countries and time frame. For example, hiring 
prestigious underwriter was considered a good way to reduce IPO underpricing level before 
1980s (Booth and Smith (1986); Carter and Manaster (1990); Michaely and Shaw (1994)) but 
prestigious underwriters are associated with higher underpriced IPOs in recent years 
(Louhgran and Ritter, 2004 and 2008).  
 
Given the present state of academic knowledge about IPO underpricing, we become 
motivated to examine this research issue after observing wide variations of IPO initial returns 
from first day trading in different countries (Loughran et al, 1994 and 2008). Evidence from 
Loughran et al (1994 and 2008) found that China and India IPOs could provide over 100 
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percent of initial returns while the US and UK IPOs normally provide about 20 percent of 
initial returns. “A picture is worth a thousand words”. Below is the chart that triggered the 
interest for our studies. 
Exhibit 1-1: Average First-Day Returns on Non-European IPOs 
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Source: Prof. Jay Ritter, University of Florida, November 2008
Average first-day returns on non-European IPOs
The above chart prompts us to question why it is necessary for the issuers to sacrifice such a 
large portion of corporate wealth while raising new capital particularly in countries with high 
average IPO first-day returns. It is suggested that this could be the result of different public 
offer contractual mechanisms applied and market environment in different countries.  
Exihibit1-2 IPO First-Day Return in Five Major Stock Exchanges in Asia-Pacific (2004-2008) 
 
With special interest in the Asia-Pacific region, we further investigate the trends of annual 
average IPO first-day return during the period of 2004 to 2008 in five major stock exchange 
markets, namely Australia, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo. As shown in Exhibit 
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1-2, IPO annual average first-day returns in Singapore and Hong Kong as compared with the 
other three exchanges show same trend but slight deviation in underpricing of IPO. Thus, we 
are motivated to study the IPO underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore, and try to 
investigate what are the main determinants resulting.  
It has also raised questions on why IPO underpricing first day returns vary even with 
countries that has similar characteristic such as geographical size and area, and business 
sector and environment. We have selected and empirically examined the IPO underpricing 
initial return in the Hong Kong and Singapore Stock Exchange Markets, given that these two 
markets being well known as major financial hubs in Asia-Pacific region with similar market 
mechanisms and geographical sizes. However, a significant difference exists in its IPO initial 
return. Evidences show that the average initial IPO return in Singapore from 441 IPOs over 
the last 34 years is almost doubled, 28.3% as compared to Hong Kong, 15.9% return in 2008 
from 1,008 IPOs over the last 27 years (Loughran et al, 1994 and 2008).  
 
1.3 Similarities between Hong Kong and Singapore 
There are many similarities between Hong Kong and Singapore. These two were known as 
"East Asian Tigers," having made the transition from poverty to newly industrialized 
economies in a relatively short time. Details of similarities are shown below: 
 
Exhibit 1-3: Similarities Between Hong Kong and Singapore 
Similarities Hong Kong Singapore 
British Colonies Yes Yes 
Geographical size Small Small 
Economic freedom High High 
Heavy immigrations from China Yes Yes 
Average Real GDP growth rate during studied period 6.34% 6.25% 
Densely populated cities (scares in land resources) Yes Yes 
Efficient governmental bodies Yes Yes 
Favor by firms from China to raise capital abroad Yes Yes 
Financial centre in Asia-Pacific Important Important 
Source: Phang, 2000, American Journals of Economics and Sociology 
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1.3.1 Hong Kong and Singapore Financial Markets 
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) and Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX) are the 
stocks markets of Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. 
HKEX, first formally established in 1891, is Asia's third largest stock exchange in terms of 
market capitalization, behind the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(HKEX.com, assessed on 17/5/09). There are two types of securities trading markets in 
HKEX, namely Main Board for common equity raising companies and Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM) for fast-growing companies. As of 31 December 2007, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange had 1,261 listed companies with a combined market capitalization of HKD10.3 
trillion (HKEX Fact book, 2008). 
SGX, inaugurated on 1 December 1999 as result of the merger of two well-respected financial 
institutions—the Stock exchange of Singapore and the Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange, is Asia-Pacific's first demutualised and integrated securities and derivatives 
exchange. On 23 November 2000, SGX became the first exchange in Asia-Pacific to be listed 
via a public offer and a private placement (SGX.com, assessed on 19/4/09). As one of the 
forefronts of exchanges, SGX has been globally attracting international issuers and is also 
rapidly becoming Asia's offshore risk management centre for international derivatives. 
Similar to HKEX, there are also two types of securities trading markets in SGX, namely Main 
Board and Singapore Catalist for fast-growing companies. By 31 December 2008, the 
Singapore Exchange had 767 listed companies with a combined market capitalization of SGD 
385 billion (SGX.com, assessed on 17/5/09).  
Both of these exchange markets, HKEX and SGX, were well-developed and have transparent 
trading systems. According to Jagannathan and Sherman (2006), the most commonly used 
IPO pricing method for both markets are public offer. However, the popularity of book 
building has been increasing in recent years for both markets (as practiced by developed 
countries). In Hong Kong, hybrid method which is the combination of public offer and book 
building is largely undertaken by underwriter to determine IPOs’ offer price whereas IPOs in 
Singapore are priced after proper book building activities (Uddin, 2008).  
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Furthermore, according to the World Development Disclosure Index in 2006 from World Bank,  
both Hong Kong and Singapore scored 10, which is the highest score indicating that both 
markets are very transparent and protect investors right by requiring more disclosure on firm’s 
financial and ownership information. La Porta et al (1997) document a number of similarities in 
both of these financial markets with respect to the codification of shareholder rights (e.g. anti 
director rights, proportional representation, proxy by mail, preemptive rights, etc.). Over 
allotment options are allowed in both markets to be exercised for price stabilization purpose 
during oversubscription of shares. Hence, difference in issues like investor protection, the 
quality of financial information disclosure and IPO share allocation do not likely affect the IPO 
underpricing level across both markets.  
 
1.4 Purpose 
The aim of this study is to investigate the main determinants that influence the underpricing 
of IPOs in HKEX and SGX over the period of 2004 to 2008. Further, the study is intended to 
examine why the level of IPOs initial returns differed between these two markets which are 
very similar in market mechanisms. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
Our study is conducted with focus on the stock exchange markets in Hong Kong and 
Singapore during the period of 2004 to 2008. Both of these markets are assumed to be similar 
for the purpose of this research even though they have different political and regulatory 
environment. Further, we have excluded Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) as they are 
created for special purpose only. 
 
1.6 Thesis outline 
A critical review of literature and empirical hypothesis, for the purpose of the research, is 
presented in the next chapter. In the subsequent four chapters, we respectively present 
methodology and data, results and discussions. Finally, the conclusion is given in the last 
chapter. 
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1.7 Audience 
Our study will be of academic interest for those in the field of corporate finance, underwriters 
and stockbrokers, practitioners in the financial community, the government and all other 
companies that plan to be listed in near future in the Hong Kong and Singapore Stock 
Exchange. 
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2. Theoretical framework and empirical studies 
In this chapter, theoretical framework is presented as the basis of our hypothesis. The chapter 
begins with the IPO Underpricing and Asymmetric Information Models, including the 
Winner’s Curse, Ex Ante Uncertainty Model and Signaling Model. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as such: IPO Underpricing and Listing Time Lag, IPO Underpricing and Market 
Timing Theories, and IPO Underpricing and Behavioral Theories.  
 
2.1. IPO Underpricing and Asymmetric Information Models   
It is a well-known fact that companies going public tend to discount their IPO subscription 
prices. Such discount is generally explained in the literature with asymmetric information 
about the security’s value and the fundamental risk of the firm. Asymmetric information 
models assume that one of participants of IPO transactions knows more than the others, and 
that the resulting informational frictions give rise to underpricing in equilibrium. Three 
models on information asymmetry are considered influential, namely the Winner’s Curse 
(Rock, 1986), the Ex Ante Uncertainty Model (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) and the Signaling 
Model (Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989)). 
 
2.1.1The Winner's Curse Model 
The Winner’s Curse Model (Rock, 1982 and 1986), an implication of Information Asymmetry 
Theory (Akerlof, 1970), is perhaps the best-known asymmetric information model of IPO 
underpricing, describing the equilibrium result of IPO underpricing.  
Rock’s model (1986) assumes IPO participants are categorized into two groups based on the 
information heterogeneity, and the IPO market is driven by the continuous participation of 
less informed participants. Some participants, classified as informed investors, have superior 
information on the true value of the IPO, than the others, classified as uninformed investors 
including the issuing firm and its underwriters. Being informed is considered costly in Rock’s 
model. Understandably, the informed investors bid only for the attractive offers with high 
expected return, which are identified by the advanced information they obtained, this will 
result in excess demand of the underpriced IPOs. As the uninformed investors have to 
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subscribe all shares indiscriminately, they would face a ‘winner’s curse’ problem: their 
demand is partly crowded out by the informed investor in attractive offers and are allocated a 
large portion in unattractive offers. This is to say that, if the uninformed investors were 
successfully allocated shares, it could be that the informed investors have not submitted 
purchasing orders since the fair value of the share is lower than expected trading price 
according to their valuation. As a result, the successful but uninformed investors are cursed by 
paying an extra amount of money for some goods which are not worthy. Consequently, the 
expected return earned by uninformed investors, ‘conditional upon being allocated shares’, is 
less than informed investors’ expected return which is ‘conditional upon submitting a 
purchase order’ (Rock, 1986). In one extreme, uninformed investors could only successfully 
subscribe overvalued IPOs, leading to negative expected return. In order to induce 
uninformed investor to participate in the IPO market (even into unattractive offers), IPO firms 
have to underprice to compensate for losses experienced by uninformed investors due to the 
winner's curse, so that the expected return of uninformed investors is non-negative (Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986). In other words, all IPOs must be underpriced to attract uninformed 
investors and to compensate informed investors since their information production activities 
are costly.  
Koh and Walter (1989) conducted a study on new issues in Singapore during the period of 
1973 to Jun 1989, and found that the Winner’s Curse was strongly evident in their study.  
Other scholars such as Lee et al. (1996) and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) found evidence 
of the Winners’ Curse in both developed and developing markets including the U.K., Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Thailand and Bangladesh, among other countries and 
regions.    
2.1.2 The Ex Ante Uncertainty Model  
The Ex Ante Uncertainty Model, originated from Ritter (1984) and formalized by Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), is a further implication following from the Winner’s Curse Model. According to 
Rock’s model, there is asymmetric information among informed and uninformed investors, 
which leads to a heterogeneous estimation of the stock’s intrinsic value and winner’s curse 
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problem. Beatty and Ritter (1986) find that this heterogeneity results uncertainty on the offer’s 
value once it starts trading, such uncertainty is defined as the ex ante uncertainty. As argued 
by Beatty and Ritter (1986), potential investors have to engage in security analysis to identify 
the offer’s true value. Such analysis in the IPO process is costly and could be analogous to a 
call option on the IPO for these investors, who will exercise the option if the ‘true’ price 
exceeds the strike price, namely the subscription price of the IPO. The value of the call option 
increases with the level of uncertainty of the issuer's value. Therefore, the greater the 
uncertainty of the firm's value, the more investors will ask for a lower IPO price to make the 
value of the call option higher, namely the larger amount of ‘money left on the table’ is 
expected by the investors for compensation of the ‘winner’s curse’ problem. In short, ‘the 
higher the ex ante uncertainty, the higher the expected IPO underpricing’ (Beatty and Ritter, 
1986). 
This model is supported by overwhelming empirical studies. The ex ante uncertainty is 
measured in a proxy measure, and the various proxies that have been used in the literature 
loosely fall into four groups: company characteristics (i.e. firm size (Ritter, 1984) and industry 
(Benveniste et al, 2003), offering characteristics (i.e. gross proceeds (Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
Habib and Ljungqvist (1998) and others) and intermediaries such as underwriter(Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), Nanda and Yun (1997), Dunbar (2000) and others), prospectus disclosure (i.e. the 
number of use of IPO funds (Beatty and Welch, 1996), and aftermarket variables (i.e. trading 
volume (Miller and Reilly, 1987), volatility (Ritter, 1984 and1987)). The most important 
determinants of the uncertainty are the deal size and the firm size. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
predict an inverse relationship between the deal size and the degree of underpricing. Evidences 
from the studies of Tomczyk (1996) and Rahman and Yung (1999) confirm that it is significant 
in explaining the pricing of new shares. 
 
2.1.3 Underpricing as a Signal of Firm Quality  
The Signaling Model of underpricing is originated from Ibbotson (1975) and further 
developed by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989). In 
contrast with Rock’s assumption regarding the informational asymmetry between issuing 
firms and investors, the Signaling Model of IPO assumes that firms have better information 
10 
 
An Empirical Examination of IPO Underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore 
about the present value or the risk of future cash flows than investors. As a result, the 
underpricing of IPO is used to signal the quality of the firm. The model argues that ‘good’ 
firms wish to signal investors their superior prospects, in a term of underpriced IPO and large 
amount of retained ownership (Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and 
Welch (1989)). In the words of Ibborston (1975), such underpricing is to ‘leave a good taste 
in investors’ mouths’. Hence, ‘good’ firms prompt to diversify themselves from the pool of 
‘bad’ issuers by credibly signaling their quality in order to raise capital on more advantageous 
terms in subsequent seasoned issues (Welch, 1989). The logic is that only ‘good’ firms are 
able to recoup the losses after their IPO performance is realized. However, the ‘bad’ firms 
could not mimic what the ‘good’ firms do, as the owners of the ‘bad’ firms know they are 
unable to sustain profitability to recoup the initial losses from underpricing. Thus, the model 
provides an explanation for the IPO underpricing as an ‘equilibrium signal’ of firm’s quality 
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). 
In common with the other asymmetric information theories of underpricing, the signaling 
models also predict a positive relationship between underpricing and the ex ante uncertainty 
on firm value, such as profitability, size and speed (Ritter (1986), Uddin (2001 and 2008)). 
The signal of a firm’s quality has extent to a wider range, including pre-IPO leverage (Su, 
2004), the quality of the board of directors, direct information disclosure to IPO investors, the 
choice of particularly reputable parties who could perform a ‘certification-of-quality’ role, 
such as underwriters (Booth and Smith (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), Michaely and 
Shaw (1994)), auditors (Titman and Trueman, 1986), or venture capitalists (Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) and Lee and Wahal (2004)).   
2.2 IPO underpricing and Listing Time Lag 
The problem of listing delay was discussed as institutional lag by Ritter in 1984, finding that 
the time difference between listing announcement date and trading date could unintentionally 
result in high level IPO underpricing for firms in specific industry, for instance natural 
resources industry. However, the effects of listing delay in different countries are firstly 
recognized by Loughran et al (1994) that IPO listing on the exchange is delayed from one day 
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to three months after fixing the offer price, Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) further argue that 
the time lag between the date the issue price is set and the first-day market trading positively 
affects IPO underpricing by analyzing the listing time lag effects on the IPO underpricing in 
U.K. and U.S.A.: The IPO offer price in UK is fixed much earlier than listing date, whereas in 
US the time lagging between price fixing dates and listing date is only one day. This is also 
supported by other empirical findings (Chan et al (2004) and Uddin (2001 and 2008)), who 
argue that an IPO is underpriced to a greater extent if there is a long listing lag. They point out 
that the IPO underpricing is positively related to the number of days between offering and 
listing in China and Malaysia.  
However, Lee et al. (1996a and 1996b) found such relationship is significantly negative in 
Australia but insignificantly negative in Singapore. Several arguments have been formed in 
explaining this inconsistency. Lee et al (1996a and 1996b) argue that the time between 
prospectus registration and listing may proxy for informed investors demand as ‘underpriced’ 
issues will sell more quickly prior listing because informed investor demand will be stronger 
for such issues. However, Uddin (2008) argues that greater listing time lag could increase the 
IPO ex ante uncertainty; but issuers and underwriters may not correctly predict the extent of 
ex ante uncertainty about IPO valuation. Hence, the empirical tests on the effect of listing 
time lag and ex ante uncertainty are not consistent across countries and time period. 
2.3 IPO Underpricing and Market Timing Theory 
Market Timing Theories are often used to explain why there are more IPO activities in some 
periods (hot-market period) than in others (cold-market period) and are often associated with 
information asymmetry theory. Lucas and McDonald (1990) firstly investigate this hot-market 
effect and argue that firms prefer to issue new equity in a bull market instead of a bear market 
so that they can get a more favorable pricing. Derrien (2005) argue that individual investors’ 
demand is positively related to market conditions. In other words, investors in a bull market 
are overoptimistic and firms respond by issuing equity as a window of opportunity (Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), Welch and Ritter (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) and 
Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Evidences show that the average IPO first-day returns during the 
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dot-com bubble were almost four times higher (65%) than that (15%) in late 1990s (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004). Cook et al (2003) refine this analysis by conditioning on hot and cold 
markets. They find that IPO firms trade at higher valuations only in hot markets. This is also 
supported by Derrien (2005) and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) that the pre-issue 
shareholders of the overpriced IPO firms, who expect a high initial return, tend to take 
advantages of overoptimistic investors by choosing to go IPO in hot market period. They 
argue that many IPOs listed in U.S. market during the internet bubble period have become 
‘penny stock’ or have been delisted (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). 
2.4 IPO Underpricing and Behavioral Theories 
IPO underpricing phenomenon could also be explained on the behavioral perspective. 
Specifically, behavioral theories associated with finance are categorized into two, which are 
cognitive psychology and the limits to arbitrage (Ritter, 2003). Cognitive refers to how people 
think. One of the behavioral theories called investors’ sentiment theory is interested in the 
effect on stock price of ‘irrational’ or ‘sentiment’ investors, who bid up the share price 
beyond true value of the firm. Ljungqvist et al (2004) and (Yan, 2005) assume some sentiment 
investors hold optimistic beliefs about the prospects for the IPO companies although those 
firms are difficult to value due to lack of prior history, young, immature and relatively 
information opaque. Cook, et al (2006), Cormelli et al (2006) and Dorn (2003) also document 
that retail investors do not update their prior beliefs about the value of an IPO in an unbiased 
fashion and tend to overpay for IPOs listed in hot market period, and for IPOs that have more 
promotional activities. In other words, sentiment investors ‘irrationally’ reply on their own 
information sources and interpretation of their knowledge on IPO firms’ value and tend to 
overpay in hot market period. Investors’ irrational’ behaviors are also supported by the 
‘informational cascades’ theory (Welch, 1992). The theory suggests that if investors make 
their investment decisions sequentially later, investors can condition their bids on the bids of 
earlier investors rationally disregarding their own information. As a consequence, demand is 
either oversubscription or remains low over time, which is also supported by Amihud et al 
(2003) analysis of demand and allocations in Israeli IPOs. To sum up, while sentiment 
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investors make their investment decisions based on overoptimistic and irrational belief on 
shares’ value, a positive informational cascades forms and later investors might blindly follow 
the cascades disregard their own information.   
 
2.5 Summary 
Overall, these theories from previous scholars and studies explain the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon. However, the previous empirical findings indicate that the inconsistency of 
those theories across markets and time periods. Thus, we build hypotheses to research on the 
determinants of IPO underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore during 2004-2008, which are 
presented in the following chapter.  
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3. Methodology and Data  
The following part describes the data and research method used in this thesis. For the 
purpose of the thesis, the most suitable method is a mixed designed research that combines 
both qualitative and quantitative data. A statistical analysis can identify the development of 
IPO underpricing over the past 5 years on both Hong Kong and Singapore and provide the 
fundamental of hypothesis testing, while a carefully designed regression model based on the 
theoretical framework and empirical data would provide the insights and explanation to such 
IPO underpricing activities and the differences.  
 
3.1 Research Approach  
The aim of our studies is to empirically test some of the theoretical explanations behind the 
IPO underpricing phenomenon by building a series of hypothesis; hence we use a deductive 
approach (Saunders et al, 2003). We have also applied inductive approach while trying to 
develop new hypothesis to explain the correlation between the local code with lucky number 
‘8’ on Chinese culture perspective and the market adjusted initial return in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
Thus, we have chosen to make use of a combination of deductive and inductive research, 
since it is the most suitable approach for the purpose of this paper in explaining the different 
level of IPO underpricing between these two countries.  
 
3.2 Research Method  
In order to identify the general IPOs underpricing determinants, and explain the different level 
of IPOs underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore, we used both quantitative and qualitative 
data which allow us to analyze these determinants with greater accurate view of the market 
reality. The quantitative data provides us an objective overview of the correlation between the 
IPO underpricing level and its determinants; while the qualitative data gives a more nuanced 
explanation to how and what impacts on the pricing of these IPOs.  
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3.3 Hypotheses 
Firm Specific Factors 
According to the signaling model, the quality of the firm is positively related to IPO’s initial 
return based on the assumption that good firms tend to underprice as a signal to the market. 
They are confident that they are able to recoup the initial loss in the future (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989). Furthermore, the model also predicts that IPO underpricing is positively 
related to the ex ante uncertainty on firm value, such as profitability, size, financial leverage 
and speed (Ritter (1986), Su (2004), Uddin (2001 and 2008)). Informed investors were 
expected to prefer fundamentally strong and high quality firms than underperformed and 
inferior firms. Thus, this would inflate the IPO price of the high quality firm on the first day 
of trading in the stock market due to high demand from investors by fixed supply of IPO 
shares (Lowry et al, 2008). IPO shares in high quality firms will be in demand as investors 
who make sequential later investment decision would follow the earlier investors according to 
Welch’s theory of informational cascades (1992). Consequently, this would result in high 
initial return on the IPO price of the high quality firm. 
We use several accounting measure as the proxy to analyze the firm’s quality such as 
profitability, solvency, financial leverage, and size. As such, we constructed four 
sub-hypothesis using the above firm’s quality as a proxy measure to explain the expected IPO 
underpricing relationship with each firm’s quality determinants. 
 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) argue that the key differences between underpriced and 
overvalued IPO firms are their (current) profitability before IPO. Higher profitability signals 
good quality. Thus, the profitability should be positively related to the underpricing level. We 
defined operating margin as the proxy for firm’s profitability as we believe that it is a more 
stable measure of profitability than net profits. The main reason is that operating margin is not 
affected by non-operating items and therefore represents the intrinsic value of the firm. Another 
reason is that some of our IPO firms have positive operating but negative net profits, which 
make the use of net profit margin a little restrictive. As a result, a sub-hypothesis is conjectured 
as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1-a: IPOs of firms with high degree of profitability are expected to be more 
underpriced than IPOs of firms with low degree of profitability in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
 
Low leverage and high degree of solvency signal the firm’s strong cash flow position. Under 
the signaling model, such firms are more likely to underprice (Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989). Denis and Mihov (2003)) argue that the 
firm’s leverage indicates the firm's reputation in credit markets as firms with high leverage are 
more likely to issue public debt. This would cause a hard budget constraint on managers and 
limits management’s control over firm’s future cash flows. Thus, managers will not 
underprice their IPO as they have lack of confidence in recovering their initial loss. Based on 
the discussion above, we have constructed hypothesis 1-b and c:  
Hypothesis 1-b: IPOs of firms with high degree of solvency are expected to be more 
underpriced than IPOs of firm with low degree of solvency in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
Hypothesis 1-c: IPOs of firms with a low degree of financial leverage are expected to 
be more underpriced than IPOs of firms with a high degree of financial leverage in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
The firm size can be considered as a proxy that measures how well established the IPO firm is. 
Ritter (1984) and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), among others, assume a negative 
relationship between IPO underpricing and firm size. The logic behind is that there tends to be 
more uncertainty on valuation on small firms, since they are speculative. As a result, the 
uncertainty on evaluating the small firm faced by the investors might be much higher than that 
on large firm. In this case, investors might ask for the larger amount of ‘money left on the desk’ 
as compensation for the higher risk. Thus, we expected a positive relationship between IPO 
underpricing and market value of the firms in Hong Kong and Singapore, leading to another 
sub-hypothesis constructed as below: 
Hypothesis 1-d: IPOs of large firms are expected to be less underpriced than IPOs of 
small firms in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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Firm riskiness such as technological and valuation uncertainty of the firm was also an ex ante 
uncertainty factor that was used to explain in IPO underpricing. According to Rock’s model 
(1982), riskier issue (firms with valuation uncertainty) will be more underpriced than less 
risky firms to induce uninformed investors to participate their IPO offer. Evidences from 
Ritter (1984) also show that riskier IPOs will be more underpriced than less-risky IPOs since 
it is an equilibrium condition to induce investors to participate in the IPO market.  
High growth companies who want to go IPO are usually not listed in the main board due to 
the restriction in the listing rules on profitability requirement and high cost incurred. In order 
to raise capital in the market, they could alternatively go public through GEM or Catalist in 
Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. As the requirement to be listed in these secondary 
boards is much lower than the main board, we expect that higher valuation uncertainty for 
these firms. Consequently, we assumed that firms listed in GEM or Catalist ought to be highly 
underpriced to compensate the investor for the risk they are willing to take. Following these 
logics, we constructed our second and third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: IPOs of firms which operate in risky industry are expected to be more 
underpriced than IPOs of firms which operate in less risky industry in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. 
Hypothesis 3: IPOs of firms listed in GEM or Catalist are expected to be more 
underpriced than IPOs of firms listed in Main Board in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) firstly argue that the amount of gross proceeds, among offering 
characteristics, is one of the primary proxy for ex ante uncertainty faced by IPO firms. Since 
then, the gross proceed, measuring how much capital the firm intend to raise (based on firm’s 
current valuation and future prospects), has become a popular proxy measure for the risk on 
firm’s value. Many empirical findings conducted by previous studies have confirmed that the 
amount of gross proceeds is negatively related to the degree of IPO initial return since 
‘smaller offers are more speculative on average than larger offers’ (Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
Loughran and Ritter (1986), Habib and Ljungqvist (1998)). Consequently, we conjecture our 
fourth hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 4: IPOs of firm with larger offerings are expected to be less underpriced 
than IPOs of firm smaller offerings in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Market Specific Factors 
The market condition during the firm’s IPO listing period has significant influence on the 
initial return of the firms share at the first day of trading. It was best evidenced from 
Loughran and Ritter (2008) whereby IPO firm average first-day return jumped to 65% during 
the internet bubble years (hot issue period) in 1999-2000 from 15% during 1990-1998, before 
and then reverting to 12% during 2001-2003. This phenomenon was explained as individual 
investors’ demand is positively related to market condition as he or she is highly 
overoptimistic with the market performance and tends to respond positively to new 
opportunities in the market (Derrien, 2005). Based on this logic, we build our fifth hypothesis 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: The initial return of IPOs listed in ‘hot’ period would be higher from 
that of the IPOs listed in ‘cold’ period in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
From theoretical framework, listing time lag was usually explained using ex ante uncertainty 
model from Loughran et al (1994).  It was expected that the longer the time lag between listing 
date and announcement date, increases the IPO ex ante uncertainty, thus required more discount 
on IPO price. The reason is that the appropriate level of IPO pricing cannot be measured 
accurately because the effectiveness of the IPO market valuation reduces following the longer 
time lag.  This relationship was empirically examined by Chan et al (2004) and Uddin (2001 
and 2008) in China and Malaysia respectively. 
 
However, earlier studies in Australia and Singapore (Lee et al, 1996a and 1996b) show negative 
relationship between time lag and IPO initial return. Lee et al (1996a and 1996b) further 
explained that the time lag between announcement date and listing date may capture the effect 
of winner’s curse which uninformed investor s faced from the presence or absence of informed 
investor demand. 
 
19 
 
An Empirical Examination of IPO Underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore 
The difference in empirical findings indicates that there is an inconsistent explanation of the 
relationship between listing time lag and IPO underpricing across countries.  However, we 
expect listing time lag to be significantly positive related to IPO underpricing, given that the 
average listing time lag (14 days) and average market adjusted initial return (15.51%) in Hong 
Kong , are lower than those in Singapore (47 days and 24.07%) from 2004 to 2008. Thus, we 
build our sixth hypothesis and this hypothesis can be further constructed as follows: 
Hypothesis 6: IPO underpricing ought to be positively related to listing time lag in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Hypothesis 6-a: IPO underpricing in Singapore ought to be significantly higher than 
that in Hong Kong due to longer listing time lag. 
 
Information asymmetry between uninformed investors and informed investors can be 
explained in the form of aggregate demand for the IPO (Lowry et al, 2008). Lowry et al (2008) 
noted that as IPO is a common-value share allotment method, the aggregates demand 
uncertainty should be positively related to the level of underpricing. Since the supply of the 
IPO shares relies on the issuing firms and is almost constant, the price is fluctuated by the 
demand side. In other words, the IPO is more underpriced if the demand of the shares exceeds 
supply. This means an IPO that is oversubscribed in the pre-market sale almost certainly will 
experience a short-term price increase in the secondary market (Gouldey, 2006). Evidence 
(Lee et al, 1996b) shows that the initial return is positively related to the level of 
oversubscription in Singapore from year 1973 to 1992. The oversubscription can be expressed 
by the exercise of over allotment option of the IPO. This indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between the IPO underpricing and the exercise of over allotment option. As both 
Hong Kong and Singapore markets also practice book building IPO method which allows the 
practice of over allotment options, our seventh hypothesis are stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 7: IPO firm exercising over allotment option are expected to be more 
underpriced in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Underwriters are believed to have better information of the IPOs as compared to other IPO 
participants under price delegation theory of Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1979, 
1982). It is expected that underwriters are able to identify risky and less risky deals. 
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Evidences from Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that highly ranked underwriters tend to avoid 
risky deals. Hence, IPO firms especially risky firms tend to choose prestigious underwriter to 
signal the credibility of the firm. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) point out that risky firm tend 
to benefit more from having prestigious underwriters manage their IPOs and actively seek them 
out. Hence, it was expected that underwriter reputation plays a significant role in signaling of 
the firm’s reputation. 
From the signaling theory, it was assumed that good firms tend to be more underpriced to signal 
the quality of the firms as they believed they would be able to recoup the initial losses in the 
future. Therefore, given that reputable underwriters would choose good firms, this explained 
the more prestigious the underwriter, the higher is the IPO underpricing level. This forms our 
eighth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: IPOs backed by prestigious underwriters are expected to be more 
underpriced in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Investor’s behavior and their market perspective are viewed to be highly correlated to their 
cultural background. In Hong Kong and Singapore, Chinese cultural is very influential since 
the Chinese are the major population in both of these countries. In recent years, investors 
from Mainland China have increasingly participated in both markets. The influence of 
Chinese culture on the fundamental value of investor views towards business environment has 
multiplied significantly. 
 
Firms prior to IPO are not required to disclose any insider information of the firms to the 
public. Consequently, only limited IPO information is available in the market for investor to 
value the IPO’s intrinsic value other than IPO firm’s prospectus. Thus sentimental investors 
would rely on other alternative source of information that signals the firm’s quality.  
In Hong Kong and Singapore, it is common for Chinese investors to speculate stock 
performance from stock code numbers as a basic trading strategy based partially on 
superstition and self-fulfilling prophecy. According to Areddy (2007) from the Wall Street 
Journal, the Chinese commonly believe that numbers contain clues to good fortune, especially 
the auspicious number ‘8’ which depicts rich and fortune. Evidences from extreme example, 
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the Beijing Summer Olympics opening ceremony starts on 8/8/08 at 8 minutes, 8 seconds past 
8 pm. Hence, it was expected that Chinese investor perceive that shares with a number ‘8’ in 
the stock codes would bring good fortune, thus increase the demand of the shares. This 
phenomenon could be supported by the investor sentiments theory from Ljungqvist et al 
(2004) as investors disregard the valuation of the shares but irrationally invest based on their 
sentiment on number ‘8’. Furthermore, as the belief of the lucky number ‘8’ is very well 
spread in the Chinese society, it prompts investors cascade towards shares with lucky code 
which leads to high returns. Since Hong Kong and Singapore are highly populated with 
Chinese, it was expected that there is a positive reaction of the investors in these countries 
regarding the lucky number ‘8’. Thus, we formed our ninth hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 9: IPO shares with lucky number ‘8’ in their local codes are expected to 
experience higher initial return in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
 
Here below shows the summary of our hypotheses, supported by theories and empirical 
studies: 
Exihibit 3-1 Summary of Hypotheses  
Hypotheses Supported Theories 
Firm Specific Factors  
Hypothesis 1-a: IPOs of firms with high degree of 
profitability are expected to be more underpriced than 
IPOs of firms with low degree of profitability in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989); Chemmanur (1993); Grinbatt and Hwang 
(1989);, Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004) ;Welch (1989) 
Hypothesis 1-b: IPOs of firms with high degree of 
solvency are expected to be more underpriced than IPOs 
of firm with low degree of solvency in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989);  Welch (1989); Grinbatt and Hwang 
(1989); Chemmanur (1993); Hogholm, (1994), and 
Denis and Mihov (2003) 
Hypothesis 1-c: IPOs of firms with a low degree of 
financial leverage are expected to be more underpriced 
than IPOs of firms with a high degree of financial leverage 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989);  Grinbatt and Hwang (1989),  Welch 
(1989);Chemmanur (1993); Denis and Mihov 
(2003), and Su (2004) 
Hypothesis 1-d: IPOs of large firms with are expected to 
be less underpriced than IPOs of small firms in Hong 
Kong and Singapore 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989); Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989); Grinbatt and Hwang (1989);  Welch 
(1989),  Chemmanur (1993); Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004); Gregoriou (2006) 
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Hypothesis 2: IPOs of firms with higher risk are expected 
to be more underpriced than IPOs of firms with lower risk 
in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) 
Hypothesis 3: IPOs of firms listed in GEM or Catalist are 
expected to be more underpriced than IPOs of firms listed 
in Main Board in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) 
Hypothesis 4: IPOs of firm with larger offerings are 
expected to be less underpriced than IPOs of firm smaller 
offerings in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Habib and Ljungqvist 
(1998) and others 
Market specific factors  
Hypothesis 5: The initial return of IPOs listed in hot 
period would be higher from that of the IPOs listed in cold 
period in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Lucas and McDonald (1990); Loughran et al 
(1994);  Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002); 
Loughran and Ritter (2004); Welch and Ritter 
(2002); Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and 
Derrien (2005) 
Hypothesis 6: IPO underpricing ought to be positively 
related to listing time lag in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Loughran et al (1994); Chowdhry and Sherman 
(1996); Lee et al. (1996a and 1996b); Chan et al. 
(2004) and Udinn (2001 and 2008) 
Hypothesis 6-a: IPO underpricing in Singapore ought to 
be significantly higher than that in Hong Kong due to 
longer listing time lag. 
Loughran et al (1994); Chowdhry and Sherman 
(1996); Lee et al. (1996a and 1996b); Chan et al. 
(2004) and Udinn (2001 and 2008) 
Hypothesis 7: IPO firm exercising over allotment option 
are expected to be more underpriced in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
Rock (1986); Lee et al. (1996a and 1996b);  
Gouldey (2006) and Lowry et. al (2008)  
Hypothesis 8: IPOs backed by prestigious underwriters are 
expected to be more underpriced in Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
Beatty and Ritter (1986); Booth and Smith (1986); 
Carter and Manaster (1990); Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) 
Hypothesis 9: IPO shares with lucky number ‘8’ in their 
local codes are expected to experience higher initial return 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Welch (1992); Amihud et al (2003); Dorn (2003);  
Ritter (2003);  Ljungqvist et al (2004); Cook et al 
(2006) and Cormelli et al (2006) 
 
3.4 Data 
We examined the above hypotheses using a relatively large sample covering the 5 years 
period from year 2004 and year 2008. The sample sets consists the 536 IPOs listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Market (283) and Singapore Stock Exchange Market (253).  
 
3.4.1 Data Collection  
Due to the large sample size of 536 IPOs from both exchange markets during our studied 
period, primary data is not feasible to collect from these companies. We were forced to rely on 
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the secondary data primarily extracted from Thomson Financial’s DataStream Advance 4.0 
and Reuters 3000Xtra Database. We have also collected missing information for hundreds of 
observations from a number of sources, including companies’ prospectuses and annual reports, 
stock exchange markets websites, internet websites, government statistics, and various other 
secondary sources.  
 
3.4.2 Excluded sample  
After analyzing the data collected, we have excluded some observations that could otherwise 
distort our findings. First, we have excluded REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) and other 
trusts which were created for specific purposes as their first day return could be distorted by 
specific reasons (e.g. availability to public subscription).  
Exhibit 3-2: Market Adjusted Initial Return in Hong Kong and Singapore (2004-2008) 
 
Source: Own construction based on data collected from DataStream. 
 
We have also excluded a total of 3 outliners which have abnormal market adjusted initial 
return more than 250% from both markets to avoid distortion in our findings and 30 
companies, 4.7% of total IPOs, due to incomplete information. What remains are almost all 
IPOs in the exchange markets with the sample size of 536 companies with complete 
information. According to Loughran and Ritter (2008), there is no survivorship bias by using 
Thomson Financial Ltd and Reuters databases as there is no evidence that subsequent 
‘winners’ are more comprehensively or accurately covered than other IPOs. 
 
3.4.3 Other company specific data 
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Company specific data, such as information regarding debt and book value of assets, was 
collected using Reuters 3000Xtra database, Reuters. From this source, currency exchange rates 
were also retrieved. Exchange rates were used in order to recalculate all companies’ financial 
data into local exchange market currency, thus enabling better comparisons between firms from 
different countries. The exchange rates used were the spot rates at the end of the year which was 
practiced in Reuters database. Furthermore, financial data of firms listed in Singapore Stock 
Exchange were translated into Hong Kong dollar for the comparisons across stock exchange 
markets. 
 
3.5 Validity and Reliability  
By using a combination of both qualitative and quantitative method, we believe our research 
is valid and reliable.  
 
For our studies to have high validity, it is important that the method chosen is able to measure 
the purpose of our studies. The method chosen in our studies is similar in many aspects with 
previous studies regarding IPO underpricing dated back since 1960s. Most of the explanatory 
variables selected for our studies to explain the IPO underpricing level were used and 
supported by previous studies. There are only two explanatory variables that are specially 
designed in this paper to explain the underpricing level between Hong Kong and Singapore, 
namely over allotment option exercised and lucky meaning ‘8’ in local stock code. These new 
explanatory variables were designed given the characteristic of the markets which are similar 
in many aspects. To our knowledge, these two variables have not been used in previous 
studies. We believed that by adding these explanatory variables, it would help to serve the 
purpose of our paper. Therefore, the chosen method is judged to be valid. 
 
To generate reliable result, the method and data used must be collected from trustworthy 
resources. In our studies, IPOs information collected from Reuters and DataStream databases, 
which are judged to be reliable after cross checking with company announcements (e.g. 
Annual reports and IPO allotment results). Announcements from company are considered as 
the best proxy of information available to external investors, and therefore reliable and 
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trustworthy. Data accuracy and errors are also checked and corrected prior running the 
regression test.  
 
Our regression model is performed using OLS in the econometric software EViews, popular 
software within statistical research. For OLS to present a correct result certain assumptions has 
to be fulfilled. A series of tests has been performed to test the assumptions of OLS. All tests 
have resulted in acceptable values which could not indicate untrustworthiness and 
unreliability. The main problem in our regression test is a lack of normally distributed residuals. 
Outliers have also been excluded and several of the variables have been transformed into 
logarithmic values to enable the regression to be more normal distributed. However, according 
to Brooks (2005), if the sample is large enough a lack of normality does not pose a problem. For 
our studies, a total sample of 536 IPOs is collected, which deemed to be a large sample that 
allow us to disregard the normality. Hence, we would conclude that our data and regression 
model is reliable to serve the purpose of our studies. 
 
3.6 The Regression model 
Regression model are widely used in IPO underpricing research, e.g. Ritter (1984), Su (2004), 
among others. Two regression models, univariate and multivariate regression models are used 
in our studies to test our hypothesis with the correlation between the dependent variable, 
Market-adjusted Initial Return and other independent variables. The potential problem with 
this approach is the existence of significant white’s heteroscedasticity in the error term. Thus, 
we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with a white’s heteroscedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix (Brooks, 2005). Both of these models are explained as follows: 
 
3.6.1 Univariate regression model 
Univariate regressions are performed with IPO Market-adjusted Initial Return as dependent 
variables, in each industry category for Hong Kong and Singapore to analyze the significance 
in the difference of IPO underpricing.  
 
The industries need to be reclassified due to the different industry classification systems 
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between Hong Kong and Singapore. The classification system in Hong Kong called Hang 
Seng Stock Classification System, classifies the sectors as 1) Energy, 2) Materials, 3) 
Industrial goods, 4) Consumer goods, 5) Services, 6) Telecommunications, 7) Utilities, 8) 
Financials, 9) Properties & Construction, 10) Information Technology, 11) Conglomerates. On 
the other hand, Singapore stock exchange classifies the sectors as 1) Commerce, 2) 
Construction, 3) Finance, 4) Manufacturing, 5) Hotels and Restaurants, 6) Properties, 
7)Multi-industry. For the purpose of comparing the IPOs in these two markets, we combine 
some sectors, e.g. Industrial and Consumer goods in Hong Kong and Commerce and 
Manufacturing in Singapore are kept in one category; Conglomerates in Hong Kong and 
Multi-industry in Singapore are kept in the category of others. We categorize the industries in 
both markets into eight industries according to the similar characteristics of the industries. 
These eight industries are shown as following: 1) Energy & Materials; 2) Financials & 
Finance; 3) Industrial & Consumer Goods, Commerce, Manufacturing; 4) IT & Electronic 
Manufacturing; 5) Properties & Construction; 6) Real Estate Investment & Services; 7) 
Telecommunications, Utilities and Hotel & Restaurants; 8) Others. 
 
3.6.2 Multivariate regression models 
To investigate the combined effect, a multivariate regression model is carefully designed 
based on the independent variables that are mostly selected on the basis of findings of 
previous research work. The independent variables are grouped into two categories, which are 
firm specific factors and market specific factors, to explain the IPO underpricing level.  
Independent variables grouped under firm specific factors are used to measure the firm’s 
quality prior to IPO. These variables are:  
(1) Operating margin; 
(2) Net assets; 
(3) Debt to Market Value of Equity; 
(4) Firm size; and 
(5) Firm - industry riskiness;  
(6) Listing Board; and 
(7) Gross Proceeds. 
27 
 
An Empirical Examination of IPO Underpricing in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Independent variables grouped under market specific factors are used to measure the 
significant impact on IPO underpricing level from the business environment factors, are: 
(1) “Hot” or “Cold” market condition; 
(2) Time lagging; 
(3) Overallotment option exercised; 
(4) Underwriter’s reputation; and 
(5) Lucky number ‘8’ on local code. 
Using a multivariate regression model, we examine which independent variables hold 
significant position in explaining the IPO underpricing level in Hong Kong and Singapore 
respectively and whether the different in IPO underpricing level between these countries can 
also be explained by the firm and market independent variables presented above over the 5 
years studied period. The above chosen variables specification are from IPO firm’s pre IPO 
information and will be described in details in Appendix 1-1 and 1-2. 
  
3.6.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The Level of Underpricing 
The level of underpricing is assumed to be reflected in the first day trading return of investors. 
In our studies, we measure the degree of IPO underpricing using stock market adjusted 
first-day return (MAR1st) (Carter et al, 1998) as follows: 
(1) Stock first-day return (Fri,1st) 
Fri,1st = (Pi,1st/Pi,0) - 1 
where Pi,1st is the closing price of the stock i on the first trading day and Pi,0 is the offer price 
of stock i. 
(2) Stock market return at the first trading day (SMRm,1st) 
SMRm,1st = (Pm,1st/Pm,0) – 1 
where Pm,1st is the corresponding Hang Seng Composite Indexes (HSCI) for Hong Kong and 
FTSE (Singapore All Capital) for Singapore market return on the first trading day and Pm,0 is 
HSCI and FTSE market return on the announcement day. 
(3) Stock market adjusted first-day return (MARi,1st) 
MARi,1st = (Pi,1st/Pi,0) – (Pm,1st/Pm,0) 
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Stock market return is the changing of the corresponding HSCI and FTSE on the 1st listing 
date of an IPO compared with that on announcement date. It indicates market sentiment of the 
total stock market in the duration period. Therefore, MAR1st can value underpricing more 
accurately because it extracts the impact of the overall stock market on an individual IPO’s 
price. 
 
3.6.2.2 Independent Variables 
Firm Size 
Previous studies from Ritter (1984) and Loughran and Ritter (2008) have used logarithm of 
revenue as firm size measurement. However, this measurement would create bias towards 
growing firms or firms in specific industry that have temporarily no revenue but potentially to 
be ranked as big firms based on the asset size. Hence, in order to make a fair comparison 
between firms, market capitalization of the firm was selected.  
 
Market capitalization was computed by using IPO firm outstanding shares multiply with the 
IPO first day closing price to reflect the ‘true value’ of the firm after floatation. We have used 
the median of market value of equity after floatation for all IPOs during the studied period to 
split the sample into two groups. Firm above median, which is the market norm, will be 
ranked as ‘Big firm’ whereas firm below median will be ranked as ‘Small firm’. This method 
was also used in previous studies such as Gregariou (2006). 
 
Firm- industry risk 
Industry riskiness is categorized using average industry beta. Industry is defined as risky if 
beta is more than 1. Beta is used as the determinant as it was assumed that the more correlated 
the industry with the overall market, the more it will be affected by the market uncertain. This 
method was also used by other empirical test such as Uddin (2008). 
 
Market Condition ‘Hot’ and ‘Cold’ 
Market hot and cold issue period is ranked based on the average quarterly market return from 
the Hang Seng Composite Index for Hong Kong and FTSE (Singapore All Cap) for Singapore. 
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We define a market as “hot” when the quarter is ranked among the top 33% of the average 
market return over our studied period. Conversely, a “cold” is one when the quarter is ranked 
among the bottom 33%. A market is “normal” if the quarter lies within the middle 34%. 
 
Underwriter reputation 
Underwriter was described as ‘prestigious’ by the numbers of IPO deals they have from year 
2004 to 2008. We ranked the top 50% of the underwriter which has more deals than others as 
‘prestigious’ as we presumed that they have hold a total of 50% market share in underwriter 
business environment.  
This method is also used by previous studies such as Hogholm (1994), Wang (2008) and 
others. Other more common ranking methods used by previous studies such as underwriter 
reputation index developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) and further updated by Carter, 
Dark, and Singh (1998) is not applicable for our studies as these indexes are bias towards on 
U.S. underwriters reputation. 
 
Lucky number ‘8’ in local code 
Investor’s irrationality with lucky number ‘8’ in Chinese Culture is a well known fact. Share 
with local code consists of number ‘8’ in Chinese culture is perceived as wealth and fortune 
(Arredy, 2007). For Hong Kong, the share codes consist of 4 digit numbers which provide 
more number combination of ‘8’ with other numbers that gives new meaning in the code 
interpretation. Thus, in order to eliminate the possibility of distortion with local codes that 
have ‘8’ as starting digit of the code due to the listing rules in Hong Kong, only share codes 
with number ‘8’ at the end of the code is selected for our studies as it represents more of the 
lucky meaning of number ‘8’.  
For Singapore, the local code consists of 3 digits in total with combination of various 
alphabetical and numbers. Due to this special characteristic, local code that contains number 
‘8’ is perceived to have lucky meaning in Singapore context. For the special meanings of 
numbers in Chinese, please refer to Appendix 5. 
 
Special considerations for independent variables 
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Net Assets, used to measure the solvency of the firm is the natural logarithm of net assets. 
Solvency is measured by natural logarithm of net assets, and financial leverage is measured 
by natural logarithm of D/E ratio. Given that many of our sample companies have zero 
long-term debt before IPO, we assigned long-term debt of zero (million) as 0.01 (million) 
with the same approach by Loughran and Ritter (2004 and 2008), since in our empirical work 
we use logarithms and logarithm of zero is undefined. If we are unsure whether the long-term 
debts are zero or are missing, we treat the value as missing. The IPO offer size is measured by 
natural logarithm of IPO gross proceeds. The aim to use the natural logarithm is to control the 
possible non-linearity and heteroscedasticity (Hogholm, 1994; Lee et al., 1996; Uddin, 2008).  
 
Here below shows the summary of expected sign towards each variable, for details, please 
refers to Appendix 1 to 2. 
Exhibit 3-3 Variables and Expected Sign 
Dependent Variable: Market Adjusted Initial Return 
Independent Variables 
Firm Specifc Variables Expected Sign  Market Specifc Variables Expected Sign 
Operating margin +  “Hot” market condition + 
Net assets +  “Cold” market condition - 
Financial leverage -  Gross Proceeds - 
Firm size -  Listing Board - 
Firm – industry riskiness +  Time lagging + 
   Overallotment option exercised + 
   Underwriter’s reputation + 
   Lucky number ’8’ on local code + 
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4. Empirical findings 
This chapter starts with data collection and selective statistics. A correlation matrix between 
variables is also provided. Lastly, the results from the performed regressions are presented 
and analyzed. 
 
4.1 Results and analysis 
In order to interpret the empirical findings with more information, descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix are presented together with our analysis of the regression results. Below are 
our result and analysis of the descriptive statistics, followed by our regression analysis: 
  
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Market Adjusted Initial Return of IPOs in Hong Kong and Singapore from 2004 to 2008 
 
Exhibit 4-1 Yearly descriptive statistics of MAIRs in Hong Kong and Singapore from 2004 to 2008 
Singapore 
Year Mean Median Max Min Standard Deviation No. of IPOs 
2004 27.06% 8.89% 349.74%* -70.60% 62.00% 69  
2005 7.79% 2.28% 129.57% -25.64% 29.37% 57  
2006 23.88% 13.96% 125.31% -74.24% 42.30% 46  
2007 48.02% 31.43% 177.65% -26.02% 53.43% 52  
2008 6.33% 4.51% 55.77% -28.61% 19.82% 29  
Total 24.07% 10.69% 329.74% -74.24% 49% 253  
Hong Kong 
Year Mean Median Max Min Standard Deviation No. of IPOs 
2004 12.62% 2.39% 381.28%* -73.08% 59.04% 58 
2005 1.40% 0.70% 41% -78.40% 19.96% 59 
2006 25.83% 19.62% 160.85% -31.74% 30.31% 59 
2007 22.75% 10.54% 192.38% -15.20% 36.66% 79 
2008 10.16% 6.57% 123.29% -15.57% 27.04% 28 
Total 15.51% 7.24% 381.28% -78.40% 39% 283 
* Outliners are excluded from our regression model analysis. 
 
Exhibit 4.1 provides some summary statistics on the sampled IPO firms in both markets. The 
sample consists of 283 IPO firms listed in Hong Kong and 253 IPO firms listed in Singapore 
from 2004 to 2008. The table shows that the mean, median, maximum and minimum of IPO 
MAIR and number of IPOs each year in both markets. The yearly average MAIR for all IPOs 
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listed over the past five years has become more stable in both countries where the IPO 
underpricing gap between firms listed in both markets has become narrow over the years. This 
could be explained by the more efficient IPO mechanism due to more pre-deal information 
are made available to the public and the gaining popularity of book-building IPO method. The 
IPO underpricing trends on both markets for these past 5 years are very much similar as both 
are situated in the same geographical region and very much correlated in their business 
environment. Both markets IPO has low MAIR in year 2005 and 2008 as they are both 
affected by the economic downturn. It was evident that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate hit low in both markets during these two years. Even the number of IPO listing 
has reduced almost half in both markets for year 2008, Hong Kong (28) and Singapore (29) 
due to the frozen liquidity in the equity market which was highly affected by the global 
financial crisis spread from the U.S. market started in the beginning of year 2008. 
 
The five-year average MAIRs of IPOs are 15.51% and 24.07% in Hong Kong and Singapore 
respectively indicates that on average, firms listed in Singapore appear to be more 
underpriced than firms listed in Hong Kong. This is also consistent with previous studies 
Ritter (2008). From the comparison between both countries, the yearly average MAIRs of 
IPOs in Hong Kong are generally less than those in Singapore except in year 2006 and 2008. 
This is consistent with the trend of the annual median first-day return comparison between 
Hong Kong IPOs in Hong Kong and Singapore. The possible explanation for irregularity in 
the IPO underpricing comparison trend in 2006 between these countries is most likely due to 
the fact that there were more firms going IPO in Hong Kong, 59, than Singapore, 46. 
Furthermore, these firms are also highly underpriced in Hong Kong during year 2006 with the 
highest IPO MAIR of 160.85% and low variance of 30.31% compared to 125.31% and 
42.30% respectively in Singapore. While in 2008, the average IPO MAIR in Hong Kong has 
increased due to one IPO which was highly underpriced, New Media Groups Holding Limited, 
123.29%, which does not reflect the true level of IPO underpricing in Hong Kong compared 
with the highest MAIR of 55.77% in Singapore. 
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Market-adjusted initial return and independent variables in Hong Kong and Singapore 
This table below presents the summary statistics of the characteristics of the IPO firms listed 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. MAIR is the initial return of the IPO at the first trading day 
adjusted with the market return. 
Exhibit 4-2 Summary statistics of MAIR and its independent variables 
Singapore Mean Medium Max Min SD 
Market-adjusted initial return (%) 24.07% 10.69% 349.74%*   -74.24%* 0.49  
Operating margin (%) 21.91% 19.41% 85.40% -39.23% 0.16  
Pre D/E ratio (%) 85.12% 2.94% 13800.80%* 0% 8.69  
Net assets (HKD mil) 168.93  18.48  31,786.58  0  1,998.59  
Gross proceeds (HKD mil) 253.00  106.00  4,969.00  16.00  469.19  
Listing time lag 47.44  43.00  235.00  9.00  28.40  
Hong Kong Mean Medium Max Min SD 
Market-adjusted initial return (%) 15.51% 7.24% 381.28%* -78.40%* 0.39  
Operating margin (%) 15.73% 13.82% 229% -429%* 0.39 
Pre D/E ratio (%) 134.17% 4.74% 27681.65%* 0% 16.50  
Net assets(HKD mil) 3,775.28  357.45 245,810.11* -6,375* 22,548.90  
Gross proceeds (HKD mil) 3,064.00  622.00  86,741.00  11.00  8,364.80 
Listing time lag 13.54  14.00  52.00  5.00  3.86  
* Outliners are excluded from our regression model analysis. 
We have noted earlier that the five-year average IPO MAIR in Singapore, 24.07%, is higher 
than Hong Kong, 15.51%, from 2004 to 2008. In Exhibit 4-2, IPO firms listed in Singapore 
on average have higher operating margin (21.91%) and lower degree of leverage (85.12%) as 
compared to IPO firms listed in Hong Kong (15.73% and 134.17% respectively). However, 
mean values in this case is somewhat misguiding, due to some extreme values as firms 
ranging from high growth to mature firms are included in the samples to have a better 
overview of the IPO markets. Thus, it is more reasonable to use median values to avoid such 
problems. Using median values, firms in both of these markets are of low leverage, with 
pre-IPO D/E ratio less than 10%. However, the median D/E ratios of Singapore firms are still 
1.8% lower than in Hong Kong. Overall, firms listed in Singapore perform better than the 
firms listed in Hong Kong and both markets have conservative capital structure. This seems to 
be consistent with the signaling theory and hypothesis 1-a and c since in order to signal the 
‘good’ quality of the firms to their investors, firms listed in Singapore will underprice more 
than the firms in Hong Kong. However, the average and median of net assets in Exhibit 4.2 
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indicate that firms in Hong Kong have better solvency ability than firms listed in Singapore. 
This is inconsistent with the signaling theory and our hypothesis 1-b. 
 
From the table above, it shows that firms listed in Hong Kong on average have higher gross 
proceeds and shorter listing time lag than Singapore. This conclusion is also consistent from 
the comparison of median values of gross proceed and listing time lag for both countries. This 
supports the ex ante uncertainty theory and our hypothesis 4, 6 and 6a from Ritter (1984) and 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) where firms with higher gross proceed and longer listing time lag 
will underprice more due to greater valuation uncertainty.   
 
4.2 Correlation Matrix 
A correlation matrix is produced to test for any multi-collinearity problems of the independent 
variables in explaining the IPO MAIR for Hong Kong and Singapore. Exhibit 4-3 below 
comprises of all independent variables used in regressions. 
 
It shows that with only one exceptional observation, there are no correlations between 
different independent variables that are well above the level that indicate multi-collinearity 
problems. Ln(gross proceeds) and Ln(net assets) have a correlation of 0.725 is due to the fact 
that the number of shares issued also depends on the number of shares owned by the existing 
shareholders. However, as the source for shares issued in IPO can come from two ways: sales 
of shares from existing shareholder and new issue of shares to IPO. After testing the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF), we found that the 0.725 correlation does not posed any 
multi-collinearity problem since the VIF does not exceed 10. Furthermore, net assets are 
interpreted as an important indicator of the solvency of the firm as it is calculated using total 
assets less total liabilities. 
 
We have also performed correlation matrix in Hong Kong and Singapore respectively Results is 
displayed in Appendix 3 and 4.There are no major differences between the combined matrix 
and each country matrix separately. 
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Exhibit 4-3 Correlation Matrix for different independent variables 
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OPERATING_MARGIN 1.0000              
LNET_ASSETS 0.0604 1.0000             
LPRE_D_E_RATIO 0.0680 0.1973 1.0000            
FIRM_SIZE_DUMMY -0.0264 0.3678 -0.0032 1.0000           
INDUSTRIAL_RISK 0.0580 0.0083 0.0423 0.0309 1.0000          
MH 0.0592 0.0480 0.0468 0.0156 -0.0237 1.0000         
MC -0.0275 0.0397 -0.0649 0.0376 0.0328 -0.4541 1.0000        
LGROSS_PROCEEDS 0.0113 0.7250 0.0965 0.6779 0.0256 -0.0035 0.0745 1.0000       
LISTING_BOARD 0.0354 0.3499 -0.0113 0.3673 0.0097 0.0219 -0.0488 0.4314 1.0000      
TIME_LAGGING -0.0209 -0.3966 -0.0266 0.0004 -0.0396 -0.0158 -0.0197 -0.2951 -0.0616 1.0000     
OVERALLOTMENT_DUMM
Y 
-0.0210 0.4888 0.0493 0.3044 -0.0377 -0.0498 -0.0628 0.5358 0.2231 -0.2980 1.0000    
UNDERWRITER_REPUTATI
ON 
0.0506 0.1361 0.1057 0.2275 0.0942 -0.0129 -0.0713 0.2290 0.0516 0.0992 0.1086 1.0000   
CODE_WITH_NO_8 -0.0159 0.1588 -0.0296 0.1172 -0.0189 -0.0176 -0.0012 0.1910 0.1410 -0.0667 0.0962 -0.0072 1.0000 - 
COUNTRY_DUMMY -0.0360 -0.6915 -0.0400 0.0007 0.0019 -0.0117 -0.0741 -0.4893 -0.1381 0.6495 -0.4436 0.1346 -0.1254 1.000 
 
 
4.3 Regression Results 
In this section, both univariate and multivariate regression are presented in order to show the 
determinants of IPO underpricing that affects Hong Kong and Singapore market to test the 
hypothesizes, and later scrutinized the determinants that explain the different IPO 
underpricing level between these two countries. 
4.3.1 Univariate tests 
Exhibit 4-4 IPO Underpricing in different industries between Singapore and Hong Kong 
White’s Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Industries MAIR(Singapore) MAIR (Hong Kong) MAIR(Singapore)-
MAIR(Hong Kong) 
t-value 
Energy & Materials 38.87%(n=27) 37.74% (n=30) 1.13% -2.3573** 
Financials & Finance 32.58% (n=4) 17.03% (n=12) 15.55% -0.1709 
Industrial & Consumer goods, 
Commerce, Manufacturing 
24.13% (n=115) 11.2% (n=106) 12.93% 0.7388 
IT & Electronic manufacturing 26.20% (n=46) 10.92%(n=47) 15.28% 0.2299 
Properties & Construction 16.61% (n=7) 12.46% (n=10) 4.15% 0.9943 
Real Estate investment & Service 2.81%(n=11) 7.35% (n=21) -4.54% 3.1747*** 
Services, Telecommunications, 
Utilities and Hotel & Restaurants 
26.20%(n=30) 19.68% (n=46) 6.52% -0.6032 
Others 1.80% (n=13) 15.36% (n=11) -13.56% 2.2334** 
Total  24.07% (n=253) 15.51% (n=283) 8.56% 3.2492*** 
Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations. The asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of 
significance respectively at one percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. 
 
Exhibit 4-4 shows t-test results for the above industries’ IPO MAIR between Singapore and 
Malaysia. Univariate tests are used to test the difference IPO underpricing level between 
Singapore and Hong Kong in different industries. We have included the three outliners that 
have abnormal high IPO MAIR in this sample to reflect the actual reality of each industry’s 
IPO MAIR comparison across both countries. As noted earlier, the average IPO underpricing 
level in Singapore is 24.07% while that in Hong Kong is 15.51%. The differences between the 
IPO MAIR for both countries, 8.56% is tested to be very significant. 
 
From the industry breakdown analysis in Exhibit 4-4, Energy and Materials industry is most 
highly underpriced among these eight industries in both markets (38.87% in Singapore and 
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37.74% in Hong Kong) and the differences of IPOs MAIRs between Singapore and Hong 
Kong, 1.13%, is tested to be significant. This is followed by Services, Telecommunications, 
Utilities and Hotel & Restaurants industry which is also highly underpriced (26.20% in 
Singapore and 19.68% in Hong Kong) but insignificant to explain the IPOs MAIR differences 
for both markets. As contrast, IPOs of firms in Real Estate Investment and Service industry 
and others industry listed in Singapore are significantly less underpriced than that in Hong 
Kong. These industries are also one of the least underpriced MAIR in these industries’ IPO for 
both markets as compared to other industries. 
 
IPOs of firms in Properties & Construction industry in Singapore (16.61%) are also more 
underpriced than that in Hong Kong (12.46%). The differences, 4.15%, could be deemed to be 
significant given the small sample size of 17. While IPOs of firms in Financials & Finance 
industry, Industrial & Consumer goods, Commerce and Manufacturing industry and IT & 
Electronic Manufacturing are more underpriced in Singapore and Hong Kong. The differences 
in MAIRs for these IPOs listed in Singapore, 15.55%, 12.93% and 15.28% respectively, 
shows that these firms are more underpriced in Singapore than Hong Kong. However, it was 
tested not significant to explain the differences in MAIR between these industries.  
 
4.3.2 Multivariate tests 
In order to provide a more extensive analysis and capture the multivariate effects of the 
possible explanations of underpricing, multivariate regressions are performed for Combined, 
Hong Kong and Singapore samples. Exhibit 4-5 presents the results from the multivariate 
analyses. The regression model for combined sample is as follows: 
Market adjusted initial returni = a0 + a1 operating margin + a2ln(net assets) + a3ln(pre D/E 
ratio) + a4firm size dummy +a5industry risk + a6 ‘hot’ market condition + a7 ‘cold’ market 
+ a8ln (gross proceeds) + a9listing board+ a10time lagging+ + a12 overallotment dummy + 
a13underwriter reputation  + a14code with no. 8 + a15country dummy + ei  
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Exhibit 4-5 Regression results using Market adjusted Initial return (MAIR) as the Dependent variables (White’s Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance) 
 Regression coefficients (t-statistics)  
Panel A: Combined sample Panel B: Hong Kong Sample Panel C: Singapore Sample Expected sign Independent variables  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2  
Constant 1.2338 (2.6441***) 1.2334(2.7017***) -0.2407 (-0.4901) 0.0378(0.5176) 3.4738(4.0207***) 3.2068 (4.0281***)  
OPERATING MARGIN -0.0093 (-7.6928***) -0.0092(-8.1616***) -0.0104(-8.6326***) -0.0108 (-10.3964***) -0.0549 (-0.3334)  + 
LN(NET ASSETS) 0.0085 (0.5224) 0.0085 (0.5134) -0.0220 (-1.0583) -0.0170(-1.4703) 0.0193 (0.6994)  + 
LN(PRE D/E ) -0.0159(-3.7285***) -0.0159(-3.7867***) -0.0147(-2.7719***) -0.0145 (-2.7841***) -0.016 (-2.5309***) -0.0136 (-2.3829**) - 
FIRM SIZE DUMMY 0.3406 (5.9361***) 0.3414 (5.8787***) 0.0716(1.2708) 0.0903(1.7852*) 0.5966(7.4685***) 0.6025(7.7759***) - 
INDUSTRIAL RISK 0.0138(0.3916)  0.0293 (0.7664)  0.0399(0.6679)  + 
‘HOT’ MARKET -0.0018(-0.0437)  0.0553 (1.13601) 0.0586(1.3609) -0.0161 (-0.2044)  + 
‘COLD’ MARKET -0.0604(-1.6194*) -0.0594 (-1.8212*) -0.0150 (-0.3483)  -0.0904 (-1.4719) -0.0906 (-1.7064*) - 
LN(GROSS PROCEEDS) -0.0696(-2.5607**) -0.0691(-2.6473***) 0.0189(0.6537)  -0.1960 (-3.7069***) -0.1804(-3.8933***) - 
LISTING BOARD -0.0009 (0.1190)  -0.0564 (-0.8040)  0.0580 (0.7091) 0.0673(0.8467) - 
TIME LAGGING -0.0009 (-1.2999) -0.0009 (-1.3293) -0.0011 (-0.2422)  -0.0005 (-0.6900)  + 
OVERALLOTMENT 
DUMMY 
0.1568(3.1340***) 0.1560(3.1634***) 0.1806(4.4772***) 0.1802(4.5522***) 0.0931(0.4882)  + 
UNDERWRITER 
REPUTATION 
-0.0669 (-1.8230*) -0.0659 (-1.8600*) -0.0029 (-0.6833)  -0.0347(-0.6028)  + 
CODE WITH NO 8 0.0328(0.7639) 0.0329(0.7700) 0.0323 (0.6793)  0.0159 (0.1896)  + 
COUNTRY DUMMY 0.1143(1.6091*) 0.1148(1.6277*)     + 
R-squared 0.1738 0.1735 0.1670 0.1582 0.2184 0.2142  
Adjusted R^2 0.1528 0.1559 0.1260 0.1395 0.1755 0.1983  
F-statistic 7.7226 9.8665 4.0711 8.4861 5.0936 13.4636  
N 536 536 283 283 253 253  
Numbers in parentheses are the t statistics of regression coefficients. The asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance respectively at one percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. 
For individual sample, Hong Kong and Singapore, the regression model is as follows: 
Market adjusted initial returni  = a0 + a1 operating margin + a2ln(net assets) + a3ln(pre 
D/E ratio) + a4firm size dummy +a5industry risk + a6 ‘hot’ market condition + a7 ‘cold’ 
market + a8ln (gross proceeds) + a9listing board+ a10time lagging+ + a12 overallotment 
dummy + a13underwriter reputation  + a14code with no. 8 + ei  
The Model 1 (shown in Exhibit 4-5) is the full model including all independent variables to 
explain the IPO underpricing in both markets (Panel A) and in Hong Kong and Singapore 
respectively (Panel B and Panel C). Model 2 is designed after scrutinizing the independent 
variables that are significant to explain the IPO underpricing for each panel. The R-Squared 
was improved in Model 2 and the result shows that the coefficient estimates are stable after 
eliminating insignificant independent variables from Model 1. There are more significant 
independent variables reflected in Panel A than in Panel B and C due to larger sample size 
from the combination of two markets. We would begin with interpreting the results from 
Panel A which shows the significant explanatory independent variables for both markets, and 
later analyze the determinants that could explain the different level of IPO underpricing 
between Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
As shown in Exhibit 4-5, Model 1 and 2 in Panel A, representing the IPO underpricing 
explanatory factors in both Hong Kong and Singapore, depict that operating margin, Ln ( Pre 
D/E ), Firm Size, Ln (Gross Proceeds) and Overallotment option are statistically significant. 
Only three of them are consistent with our expected sign of coefficient. They are Ln (Pre D/E), 
Ln (Gross Proceeds) and Overallotment which appear to support our hypothesis 1-c, 4 and 7. 
The other two independent variables that reject our hypothesis from Panel A are Operating 
Margin and Firm Size. Only underwriter reputation is deemed to be significant at 10% level in 
Panel A for both models, mainly due to larger sample size which also reject our hypothesis 8. 
This is also supported by other empirical studies (Booth and Smith (1986), Titman and 
Trueman (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990)) that issuers tend to use prestigious underwriter 
to eliminate some of ex-ante uncertainty on firm's 'real value' not resolved only by disclosing 
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in prospectus. Consequently, IPOs associated with prestigious underwriter will be less 
underprice. The remaining five other independent variables are deemed to be insignificant in 
all panels to be the main determinants of explaining the IPO underpricing level in Hong Kong 
and Singapore are: Solvency (Hypothesis 1-b), Industry risk (Hypothesis 2), Listing board 
(Hypothesis 3), Hot market (Hypothesis 5) and Time lag (Hypothesis 6 and 6a). 
 
The coefficient for financial leverage (Ln (Pre D/E)) suggests a weak negative relation with 
IPO MAIR, which appears to support the Hypothesis 1-c suggested by the signaling theory. 
This relationship is also significant across Hong Kong and Singapore (Panel B and C) to 
explain the IPO underpricing level in each market respectively. As for offer size which is Ln 
(Gross Proceeds), the coefficient also suggests a weak negative relation with IPO MAIR. This 
however support Hypothesis 4 from ex ante uncertainty theory as issuer of small offering 
underprice more to give incentive for investor who may not want to participate in the IPO. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that small offering tend to be more speculative and leads to 
greater valuation uncertainty. However, this variable is a significant determinant of IPO 
underpricing in Singapore in Panel C but not significant enough to explain the underpricing in 
Hong Kong (Panel B). Overallotment option is proved to be positively related to MAIR in 
both markets in panel A and is also consistent with our Hypothesis 7. But this variable appears 
to be more significant in Hong Kong whereby it is not significant enough to explain the IPO 
underpricing in Singapore. The possible explanation is mostly due to more over allotment 
option is exercised in Hong Kong where the book building IPO method is more widely used 
compared to Singapore. 
 
The results also suggests a very weak significant negative relation between operating margin 
and MAIR for model 1 and 2 in both combined market and Hong Kong, this rejects our 
hypothesis 1-a. However, as the coefficient can only explain a very small effect on IPO 
underpricing level, it is deemed not significant enough to provide a better overview on the 
effect of IPO underpricing. There is also a possible explanation from Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
underwriter would underpriced less for good quality firms IPO as they are more concerned on 
the commission received from the IPO issue. Under the ex ante uncertainty theory from Ritter 
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(1984), good firms tend to have less valuation uncertainty are in greater demand for informed 
investors. Thus underwriter would less underprice the good IPO in order to protect its own 
self interest, which is the commission from the IPO issue that is dependent on the gross 
proceed received. 
 
The results in the table show that firm size coefficient is more significantly related to IPO 
underpricing in Combined Market and Hong Kong but less significant in Singapore compared 
with the other two. However, as the coefficient is positive, it rejects our hypothesis 1-d 
supported by ex ante uncertainty theory which shows the opposite. The result indicates that in 
general, firm size has a positive impact on return. The possible explanation is investors are 
risk averse and have more confidence in large firms since large firms are deemed to be less 
risky and have more information available. Hence investors are willing to pay a premium for 
shares of large firms and accept lower expected return for taking less risk. This is also 
supported by empirical findings from Gu (2004). 
 
The cold market variable is only significant in the Singapore market. The Cold market 
coefficient contains the expected sign but it shows a weak negative relation with the IPO 
underpricing level, thus supports our Hypothesis 5. Even though the country dummy in the 
combined sample is significant at 10% level, it shows a positive relationship which suggests 
IPO underpricing level is higher in Singapore. 
 
Code with no '8' didn't meet our expectation in this studies as the regression models shows 
that it is not significant enough to explain the IPO underpricing level, which reject our 
Hypothesis 9. The coefficient is positive relation with IPO underpricing which proved our 
expected sign is accurate. Based on our data collected from 2004 to 2008, the average IPO 
MAIR with code no 8 is 28.06% in Hong Kong and 32.62% in Singapore, which are higher as 
compared to average MAIR of the markets in both markets. The possible explanation of this 
insignificant level is most probably due to small sample size of 60 as compared to the overall 
sample size of 536. Hence, it is not significant enough to signal the impact on the overall 
market IPO underpricing level. 
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Explanatory variables on the differences in IPO underpricing level between Hong Kong 
and Singapore 
There are two variables from the multivariate tests that could explained the differences in IPO 
underpricing level in Hong Kong and Singapore, which are D/E ratio and firm size. Both of 
these variables are tested significant from the multivariate regressions  
 
D/E ratio 
D/E ratio measures the financial leverage of the firms. From the regression model results, debt 
to equity ratio is significantly negative related to IPO underpricing level for Hong Kong and 
Singapore respectively and the result supports our Hypothesis 1-c. Based on the coefficient of 
both countries, firms listed in Singapore (-0.0136) would underprice less than firms listed in 
Hong Kong (-0.0145) if they are highly levered. This also indicates that firms with low 
leveraged would underpriced more in Singapore than Hong Kong. However, the explanatory 
relation is pretty weak as the coefficient is fairly small. Hence, we conclude that financial 
leverage of the firm could weakly explain the difference in the level of IPO underpricing in 
both markets. 
 
Firm Size  
Based on the regression model result, big firms will underprice more as compared to small 
firms. Although the results reject our Hypothesis 1-d, firm size is still a significant 
explanatory variable to explain the high IPO underpricing level in Singapore as compared to 
Hong Kong in 2004 to 2008. From the coefficient in the regression model, big firms listed in 
Singapore (0.60) are more highly underpriced than firms in Hong Kong (0.09). The 
explanatory relationship between firm size and MAIR is very strong which proved to be a 
good indicator to explain the high IPO underpricing level.  
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4.4 Summary of regression results 
Here below shows the summarized table of the results of hypotheses. 
Exhibit 4-6 Summary of Results (Model 1: Combined Sample Panel A) 
Hypotheses Accepted or 
Rejected   
Significant or 
Insignificant 
Firm Specific Factors   
Hypothesis 1-a: IPOs of firms with high degree of profitability are expected to 
be more underpriced than IPOs of firms with low degree of profitability in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Rejected Significant 
Hypothesis 1-b: IPOs of firms with high degree of solvency are expected to be 
more underpriced than IPOs of firm with low degree of solvency in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
Accepted Insignificant 
Hypothesis 1-c: IPOs of firms with a low degree of financial leverage are 
expected to be more underpriced than IPOs of firms with a high degree of 
financial leverage in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Accepted Significant 
Hypothesis 1-d: IPOs of large firms with are expected to be less underpriced 
than IPOs of small firms in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Rejected Significant 
Hypothesis 2: IPOs of firms with higher risk are expected to be more 
underpriced than IPOs of firms with lower risk in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Accepted Insignificant 
Hypothesis 3: IPOs of firms listed in GEM or Catalist are expected to be more 
underpriced than IPOs of firms listed in Main Board in Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
Accepted Insignificant 
Hypothesis 4: IPOs of firm with larger offerings are expected to be less 
underpriced than IPOs of firm smaller offerings in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Accepted Significant 
Market specific factors   
Hypothesis 5: The initial return of IPOs listed in hot period would be higher 
from that of the IPOs listed in cold period in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Rejected for 
‘Hot’; 
Accepted for 
‘Cold’ 
Insignificant 
Hypothesis 6: IPO underpricing ought to be positively related to listing time 
lag in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Rejected Insignificant 
Hypothesis 6-a: IPO underpricing in Singapore ought to be significantly 
higher than that in Hong Kong due to longer listing time lag. 
Rejected Insignificant 
Hypothesis 7: IPO firm exercising over allotment option are expected to be 
more underpriced in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Accepted Significant 
Hypothesis 8: IPOs backed by prestigious underwriters are expected to be 
more underpriced in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Rejected Insignificant 
Hypothesis 9: IPO shares with lucky number ‘8’ in their local codes are 
expected to experience higher initial return in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Accepted Insignificant 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The aim of this study is to investigate what the main determinants influence the underpricing 
of IPOs over the period of 2004 to 2008 in HKEX and SGX. Further, the study is intended to 
examine why the level of IPOs initial returns differed between these two markets with similar 
market mechanisms. The IPO underpricing gap between Hong Kong and Singapore is 11.5% 
at 10% significant level, meaning that IPOs in Singapore underprice 11.5% more than the 
IPOs in Hong Kong. 
 
Our univariate tests show that IPO firms in Energy and Materials industry in Singapore are 
underpriced more on average than the same industry in Hong Kong. On average firms listed 
in Singapore in Financial and Finance, Industrial and Consumer goods, Commerce, 
Manufacturing, IT and Electronic Manufacturing and Properties and Construction are 
underpriced more, although the underpricing level is insignificant according to our results. In 
general, firms listed in Singapore are underpriced more than the ones listed in Hong Kong. 
 
Our multivariate tests show that to some extent, operating margin, financial leverage of the 
firm, firm size, offer size, and overallotment option exercised, are the significant determinants 
of IPO underpricing level in the combined sample of Hong Kong and Singapore IPOs.  
 
The significant determinants used to explain the underpricing level in Hong Kong are 
operating margin, firm size, and overallotment option exercised. As for Singapore, the main 
significant determinants are financial leverage, firm size, ‘cold’ market condition and offer 
size. Therefore, only pre-IPO leverage and firm size can be used to explain the difference in 
the IPO underpricing level between Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
Firm size is the primary significant determinant to explain the difference in IPO underpricing 
level in Hong Kong and Singapore. Although results from the regression rejects our 
hypothesis expecting a negative relationship, the result from the multivariate regression 
models suggests a highly significant explanation to the level of IPO underpricing by 
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indicating big firms listed in Singapore are highly underpriced compared with big firms in 
Hong Kong.  
 
D/E ratio could also explain the difference in IPO underpricing between these two markets. 
However, the explanatory relation is not strong enough as the coefficient is fairly small for 
both markets. Hence, we conclude that only firm size could be significant explanation of the 
difference in IPO underpricing level in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
Recommendations  
Overall, HKEX is more efficient than SGX from the implication in the IPO MAIRs between 
these two markets. IPO underpricing level is mainly affected by the demand of investors on 
the newly IPO shares and supply of information disclosure. Big firms in Singapore, especially 
those that are in the industries of financial and finance, industrial & consumer goods and IT & 
electronics manufacturing, should hire prestigious underwriter to reduce the IPO underpricing 
level. The use of prestigious underwriter would help reducing speculative risk from lack of 
information disclosure which reduced investors’ uncertainty of the IPO firms. We have also 
found that the pre IPO researches published by investment institutions are more popular in 
Hong Kong than Singapore, which facilitates the investors to make better valuation on IPO 
firms. Thus, information supply of IPO would be a good subject for further research to 
explain the IPO underpricing phenomenon. 
. 
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Appendix 1-1: Description of Variables: Firm specific factors 
Independent 
Variables 
The Variables Definition Type of measures Selected prior studies 
using these variables 
Firm Specific Factors  
Profitability ratio Operating profit margin calculated as 
EBITDA divided by pre-IPO revenue 
of the firm. 
Continuous Purnanadam and 
Swaminathan (2004) 
Net assets Net assets calculated as total assets 
less total liabilities, measuring the 
ability of the firm to finance its debt. 
Continuous Hogholm (1994) 
Financial Leverage Financial leverage, also known as 
debt to equity ratio calculated as book 
value of long term debt over the 
market value of equity. This ratio 
measures the financing capital 
structure of the firms using debt to 
equity. 
Continuous Högholm (1994), 
Purnanadam and 
Swaminathan (2004), 
Su (2004) 
Firm Size Firm size is determined using market 
capitalization of the firm. See 
methodology section for details.  
 
Dichotomous. 1, if 
firm size is categorized 
as ‘Small’. 
Gregoriou (2006) 
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Appendix 1-2: Description of variables: Market Specific Factors 
Independent 
Variables 
The Variables Definition Type of measures Selected prior studies using 
these variables 
Market 
condition 
“Hot” and 
“Cold” 
IPO listed in Hot issue and Cold 
issue periods. See the 
methodology section for details. 
Dichotomous. 
For MH, 1 if listed in 
hot period. 
For MC, 1if listed in 
cold period 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter 
(1984), Uddin (2008) 
Listing board Listing board classification. Main 
board and 2nd Board for growth 
companies (GEM for Hong Kong 
and Capitalist for Singapore) 
Dichotomous. 1, if 
listed on the main 
board. 
Uddin (2008) 
Industry risk Industry classification of IPO as 
“risky”. All sectors are classified 
as risky and less risky based on 
the average market beta of the 
sector. 
Dichotomous. 1, if 
IPO belongs to risky 
(industry beta>1) 
sector 
Clarkson and Merkey (1994), 
Uddin (2008) 
Ln(Offer 
size) 
Gross proceed calculated as 
number of shares in the offer 
times the offer prices.  
Continuous Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
McGuiness (1992), Clarkson and 
Merkley (1994), Holgholm 
(1994), Lee et al (1996a and 
1996b), and Uddin (2008) 
Time lag Time lag between the IPO 
announcement day and the listing 
day 
Continuous Loughran et al (1994), Lee et al 
(1996a and 1996b), Chowdhry 
Sherman (1996), Chan et. Al 
(2004) and Uddin (2008) 
Overallotme
nt dummy 
Overallotment option allows 
underwriter to exercise when 
shares are oversubscribed. 
Dichotomous. 1, if 
overallotment option 
exercised 
 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
Underwriters where altogether 
hold more than 50% of market 
power in the underwriter business 
environment is considered as 
‘prestigious’. See the 
methodology section for details. 
Dichotomous. 1, if 
underwriter belongs 
to prestigious 
underwriters. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Carter 
and Manaster (1990), Hogholm 
(1994), Lin and Hsu (2008), and 
Wang (2008) 
Code with 
no. 8 
Lucky ‘8’ that is perceived as rich 
and prosperity. See the 
methodology section for details. 
 
Dichotomous. 1, if 
local code consists of 
‘8’ in Singapore and 
Hong Kong local 
codes. . 
 
Country 
dummy 
Singapore Dichotomous. 1, if 
Singapore IPO 
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Appendix 2: Industry catagories  
Industrial dummy: A dummy variables based on the adjustment in combining both the Hang Seng Industry 
Classification System and Singapore industry classification. 
 Energy & Materials 
 
Industry dummy 1: 0=energy & 
materials, 1=otherwise 
 Financial & Finance Industry dummy 2: 
0=financial & finance, 1=otherwise 
 Industrial & Consumer Goods, Commerce, 
Manufacturing 
 
Industry dummy 3: 0=Industrial & 
Consumer Goods, Commerce, 
Manufacturing, 1=Otherwise 
 IT & Electronic Manufacturing Industry dummy 4: 0=IT & 
Electronic Manufacturing, 
1=otherwise 
 Properties & Construction 
 
Industry dummy 5: 0=Properties & 
Construction, 1=otherwise 
 Real Estate Investment & Services Industry dummy 6: 0=Real Estate 
Investment & Services, 
1=otherwise 
 Telecommunications, Utilities and Hotel & 
Restaurants 
Industry dummy 7: 0=Services, 
Telecommunications, Utilities and 
Hotel & Restaurants, 1=otherwise 
 Others Industry dummy 8: 0=Others, 
1=otherwise 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix for Hong Kong 
  OPERATIN
G_MARGI
N 
LNET_ASS
ETS 
LPRE_D_E
_RATIO 
FIRM_SIZE
_DUMMY 
INDUSTRI
AL_RISK 
MH  MC  LGROSS_P
ROCEEDS 
LISTING_B
OARD 
TIME_LAG
GING 
OVERALL
OTMENT_
DUMMY 
UNDERW
RITER_RE
PUTATION 
CODE_WI
TH_NO_8 
OPERATING_MARGIN  1                         
LNET_ASSETS  0.0629  1                       
LPRE_D_E_RATIO  0.0985  0.2736  1                     
FIRM_SIZE_DUMMY                     ‐0.0462  0.5974  0.1484  1
INDUSTRIAL_RISK  0.0782  0.0176  0.0386  0.0318  1                 
MH  0.0851  0.0659  0.1179                 ‐0.0257  0.0019  1
MC  ‐                    0.0446 ‐0.0768 ‐0.1181  0.0167  0.0206 ‐0.4957  1
LGROSS_PROCEEDS                 ‐0.0143  0.6804  0.2001  0.7206  0.0418 ‐0.0372 ‐0.0181  1
LISTING_BOARD  0.0385  0.3605  0.1182  0.2967  0.0074  0.0232           ‐0.1230  0.3838  1
TIME_LAGGING  0.0328  0.1287  0.0381  0.1505           ‐0.0387 ‐0.0373  0.0113  0.1854  0.1963  1
OVERALLOTMENT_DUMMY             ‐0.0465  0.3187  0.0374  0.4456 ‐0.0699 ‐0.0912 ‐0.1154  0.4544  0.2655  0.0542  1
UNDERWRITER_REPUTATION  0.0816  0.5273  0.1482  0.6061  0.0917  0.0154     ‐0.0175  0.6451  0.2654  0.1625  0.3000  1
CODE_WITH_NO_8         ‐0.0269  0.1505  0.0487  0.0988 ‐0.0518 ‐0.0093 ‐0.0442  0.1523  0.0835 ‐0.008  0.0577  0.0046  1 
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix for Singapore 
  PROFIT_
MARGIN 
LNET_AS
SETS 
LPRE_D_E
_RATIO 
FIRM_SIZE
_DUMMY 
INDUSTRI
AL_RISK 
MH  MC  LGROSS_P
ROCEEDS 
LISTING_B
OARD 
TIME_LAG
GING 
OVERALLO
TMENT_D
UMMY 
UNDERWR
ITER_REP
UTATION 
CODE_WI
TH_NO_8 
PROFIT_MARGIN  1                         
LNET_ASSETS  0.0021  1                       
LPRE_D_E_RATIO                       ‐0.2439  0.1967  1
FIRM_SIZE_DUMMY  0.2723  0.3861                     ‐0.1686  1
INDUSTRIAL_RISK                     ‐0.0365 ‐0.0038  0.0461  0.0300  1
MH  ‐                    0.0530  0.0466 ‐0.0320  0.0618 ‐0.0524  1
MC  0.1158  0.0635                 ‐0.0103  0.0618  0.0469 ‐0.4100  1
LGROSS_PROCEEDS  0.2179  0.5678             ‐0.0858  0.7556  0.0057  0.0377  0.1473  1
LISTING_BOARD  0.2339  0.3769             ‐0.1262  0.4387  0.0113  0.0192 ‐0.0079  0.5309  1
TIME_LAGGING  0.0297  0.1471               ‐0.0120 ‐0.0171 ‐0.0674 ‐0.0133  0.0623  0.0444  0.0291  1
OVERALLOTMENT_DUMMY         ‐0.0347  0.1697  0.0431  0.1622  0.0060 ‐0.0031 ‐0.1140  0.2410  0.0979 ‐0.0318  1   
UNDERWRITER_REPUTATION                 ‐0.0078  0.0249  0.0720 ‐0.1781  0.0994 ‐0.0414 ‐0.1123 ‐0.1416 ‐0.0852  0.0043 ‐0.0144  1
CODE_WITH_NO_8  0.1151       ‐0.0158 ‐0.1523  0.1472  0.0263 ‐0.0333  0.0363  0.1294  0.1780  0.0479 ‐0.0038  0.0187  1 
Appendix 5: Numbers with Special Meanings in Chinese  
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